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U.S. ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

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INTERVIEW

OF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

C-2

MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ

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JANUARY 24, 2008

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BAGHDAD, IRAQ

This transcript was produced from tapes
provided by the U.S. Army Center of Military History.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

1
2 [b 3, b 6] This is [b(3), b(6)]
3 [b(3), b(6)] the Multinational Corps-Iraq Historian.
4 Today is Thursday, the 24th of January 2008 at
5 approximately 1630. We are here at the Headquarters
6 for Multinational Corps-Iraq at the al Faw Palace at
7 Camp Victory, outside of Baghdad, Iraq.

8 Also with me is --
9 [b(6)], the writing
10 historian for 3 Corps and CMH.

11 [b(3), b(6)] And we are
12 interviewing [b(3), b(6)].
13 [b(3), b(6)] could you introduce yourself
14 in your own voice with your rank, first name, middle
15 initial, last name?

16 [b(3), b(6)]: Yes. I am [b(3), b(6)]
17 [b(3), b(6)]
18

19 [b(3), b(6)] Thanks. I would just
20 like to refer the listener to our previous interviews
21 that are on hand with [b 3, b 6], the last one being
22 on the 10th of October 2007.

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1 [REDACTED], we have a previous release
2 form on file. If that is acceptable, we will consider
3 that to still be in effect.

4 [REDACTED] Perfectly acceptable.

5 [REDACTED] Great. I wanted to
6 start with just sort of a big open-ended question,
7 which I wanted to ask you if, as you look now in the
8 last couple of weeks of 3 Corps' tenure as the
9 Headquarters for Multinational Corps-Iraq, have the
10 defining features of who the enemy is changed?

11 [REDACTED]: Not in the last two weeks,
12 but -- But over time, if that is what your question is
13 --

14 [REDACTED] And in particular,
15 since we spoke in October.

16 [REDACTED] No. I don't believe that
17 they have changed since we spoke in November as far as
18 the groups go that we are dealing with. However, the
19 viability and capacity of those groups have changed.

20 Al Qaeda in Iraq has gotten less capable.
21 Their operating areas have diminished considerably
22 since then. The current operation that we have going

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1 on, Phantom Phoenix, which is designed to go into
2 those vestiges of AQI, is succeeding.

3 An example of that is, although we had
4 some operations going on in Diyala Province in Baqubah
5 at the time, those have intensified under Phantom
6 Phoenix, and are going quite well.

7 So the enemy there has been diminished in
8 capability and has moved, as it has in other places,
9 Al Qaeda in Iraq; and they have moved to the north
10 toward Mosul in the Nineveh Province, for the most
11 part, although there are elements elsewhere in Iraq.

12 Seems that they found Mosul to be -- or
13 the areas west of Mosul to be a better operating area
14 for them right now because of operations, as well as
15 local populace turning against them in other places.
16 So that's a change with regard to AQI.

17 Now the other element we talked about in
18 November was extremists Shia elements, JAM special
19 groups, and again although their capacity, I would
20 say, hasn't diminished, the threat from them has,
21 because of Sadr -- Moqtada al Sadr imposing a freeze
22 that is being, for the most part, by mainstream JAM

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1 followed.

2 The exceptions to following that freeze
3 are some noncompliant elements of what we call special
4 groups of Jaish al Mahdi, but when you look at attacks
5 overall, overall are done, and those are the two
6 primary reasons or, rather, two of the primary
7 reasons, friendly operations being successful against
8 AQI, the freeze by Sadr, and then in terms of Shia
9 extremists, also our operations against them. That is
10 in addition to what I mentioned before about the fact
11 the populace has turned against, actually, both of the
12 violent elements of those groups, all of AQI, and then
13 extremists JAM elements. The populace has turned
14 against them.

15 So all those factors together, yes, the
16 enemy has changed in capacity. The groups are still
17 the same.

18 (b)(3), (b)(6)

Great.

19 (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

, when we last

20 interviewed you three months ago on the 10th of
21 October, Phantom Thunder had progressed and appeared
22 to be reversing the violence.

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1 How would you assess -- This is a slightly
2 different question than the one (b)(3), (b)(6)
3 asked. How would you assess the threat today, and
4 explain or highlight the changes over the last three
5 months?

6 I know that we just launched another
7 operation, I guess, at the beginning of this month,
8 Phantom Phoenix. But if you look at November,
9 December, and up to now in January, could you assess
10 any changes or highlight any changes to the threat in
11 those three months?

12 (b)(3), (b)(6) Although the question is
13 different, the answer is very similar to what I gave.
14 We had Phantom Thunder, and we talked about that last
15 time. We had Phantom Strike, which are some very
16 specific operations that followed that, and then now
17 we have Phantom Phoenix going on.

18 So that three-month period of time covers
19 those three operations. The threat is less overall
20 than it was at the time, and those operations, I
21 believe, are the primary reason for it to be less
22 because of the effect that it had on the enemy, but

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1 also the effect that it had on the populace.

2 I mentioned that a minute ago. Because
3 security improved as a result of those operations,
4 they felt more comfortable defending themselves,
5 turning in the enemy themselves, forming Awakening
6 movements and then joining Concerned Local Citizens
7 groups as well.

8 So that the threat diminished, because we
9 killed or captured some of it, but also because the
10 local populace felt secure and took security into
11 their own hands and furthered it.

12 (b)(6) Let me follow up with that
13 just a minute. When Phantom Thunder kicked off in
14 June, Diyala was a specific target.

15 (b)(3), (b)(6) It was.

16 (b)(6) And Baqubah especially. When
17 I come back in January, I see almost replicated
18 another operation in Baqubah or in Diyala, and
19 Phantom Phoenix to chase them out.

20 Now for an observer like myself coming
21 back after a long absence, it seems like almost that
22 we are doing the same operation that we did back in

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1 June/July with 25th Division. Now we are doing it
2 with the 1st Armored Division.

3 So on the surface, that would say, hey,
4 something happened to allow those guys to go back in
5 there, but we needed to go back in there and move them
6 out.

7 (b)(3), (b)(6) The differences are Phantom
8 Thunder succeeded in terms of within the city limits
9 of Baqubah, but what happened was some elements of the
10 enemy, AQI, went to the area surrounding Baqubah,
11 Moqtadiyah specifically, up to the edge of the
12 Hammerin Mountains and along the Hammerin Ridge. So
13 in several spots around there, other small villages.
14 So we had the capacity to go into Baqubah
15 and remain, but to do significant operations in these
16 other places, we needed a combination of Coalition
17 forces and Iraqi forces.

18 So the difference is we are in the areas
19 outside of Baqubah, and we have far more Iraqi forces
20 with us this time that will be able to remain in
21 addition to Coalition forces in the area.

22 The reason we know we are having a good

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1 effect right now is the fact that the enemy has,
2 besides being captured/killed some of them -- they
3 have gone over the Hammerin Ridge, and they have gone
4 through Mosul, as I said before. So they are moving
5 out of that area.

6 They can't go back in Baqubah. So they
7 have to go somewhere else or get killed/captured or,
8 if they are fence sitters who have been with AQI, give
9 up on the insurgency and become -- rejoin the populace
10 as normal citizens. So that's the effect that it has
11 had.

12 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) Could I ask one real
13 specific follow-up to that?

14 Do we have a definitive sense at this
15 point as to the strength of AQI?

16 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) I wouldn't want the numbers
17 on it. There are some that may. We did actually
18 before our last meeting, and I don't think I pulled
19 the numbers out at that time, and I wouldn't want to
20 use those numbers anymore, because, obviously, we have
21 had an effect on them.

22 The thing about whether you are talking

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1 AQI or JAM is it can ebb and flow depending on local
2 support. You know, people join or people quit,
3 dependent on how things are going, is what happens.
4 So I wouldn't want to give you the -- We have not
5 redone the numbers.

6 The way we do it is a very specific
7 methodology, that we go out to the MSEs to get their
8 input, and we put some math to it as well, and we come
9 up with the numbers, and we haven't gone through that
10 for four or five months.

11 (b)(3), (b)(6) I wanted to ask a
12 question about -- and you kind of alluded to it; so I
13 wanted to ask more, which is: I think by anyone's
14 standard, we have had some success this year, when
15 you look back at the start of 3 Corps' tour to where
16 we are now.

17 I just wanted to ask: As you wind down to
18 your last couple of weeks, how has our success in
19 terms of things like the reconciliation initiative,
20 the rise of the Concerned Local Citizens, our success
21 in helping the populace turn away from extremist
22 groups in general -- How has that changed the nature

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1 of the intelligence collection process, or has it? Do
2 you find different things are important now that
3 weren't?

4 In other words, how do we -- What is our
5 intelligence focus in the area where we are actually
6 getting more into governance and economic development
7 issues?

8 b 3, b 6 And I would say it hasn't
9 changed a lot in the last three or four months, but it
10 has changed over our 15 months since we have been
11 here, because an example is what you just cited a
12 minute ago, intelligence support to reconciliation and
13 our involvement in it.

14 Before, we had to know, obviously, about
15 people that key leaders were engaging with, but those
16 were -- There were a lot of those, but there weren't
17 nearly as many as there are right now.

18 So knowing the motivations of the people
19 who are coming forward, some of whom would have been
20 on a targeting list not long ago -- all that has
21 developed in a kind of sophisticated way where we have
22 -- in a specific cell in the case for us. The

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1 Coalition analysis and control element, our analysis
2 section, that is what they do. We have an officer in
3 the reconciliation cell that leverages them and makes
4 sure he provides the right intel to those guys.

5 So the same is true for governance in
6 making sure we understand what is going on with the
7 key leaders in the government, how we can best
8 support, for example, the legislation that is going
9 through, those kinds of things.

10 So having insight into all of those non-
11 enemy or nontraditional targets, our collection has
12 definitely changed over this 15 months. Those are
13 just a couple of examples.

14 (b)(3), (b)(6) Is the job harder or
15 easier?

16 (b)(3), (b)(6) It's much harder. It's far
17 more complex now than it was 15 months ago, and it's
18 way more complex than it was the last tour we were
19 here, because I mean, you still have all those other
20 things that were there before.

21 They may be diminished and not as
22 threatening, but they are still there, and you still

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1 have to do the collection and the analysis on them,
2 but then you have all of these additional angles that
3 you have to follow, people that you have to support.
4 It's more sophisticated, no doubt.

5 [b 6] [b)(3), (b)(6)] in Op Ord 08-01
6 and in 07-01, you indicate in the intelligence part,
7 Paragraph 1 and in the situation, that a portion of
8 the population is anti-occupation. In fact, I've seen
9 that going all the way back to '06 and '05.

10 Can you put a more precise measurement on
11 how that anti-occupation feeling in generating
12 insurgency is? I don't know whether I stated that
13 right.

14 [b)(3), (b)(6)] No, I get it. It depends
15 on how the -- In fact, it sort of depends on how the
16 insurgency is going. That particular -- It's really
17 their information operations. That kind of a campaign
18 is more successful when the insurgency is strong.

19 In other words, it's kind of got momentum.
20 It gets momentum and gains momentum if the insurgency
21 is strong and it diminishes, but there are some
22 elements that retain it.

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1 For example, Jaish al Mahdi, you know, the
2 core of Jaish al Mahdi, even when they are being
3 cooperative, Moqtada al Sadr and all -- they are anti-
4 occupation and will always be that way. There is no
5 doubt about it.

6 Clearly, al Qaeda in Iraq, the hard core
7 al Qaeda in Iraq folks, are anti-Coalition. So both
8 Sunni and Shia have those elements that have -- When
9 they are strong and violent and they can convince the
10 populace that we are having negative effects on them,
11 that garners their support. There is no doubt about
12 it.

13 There's a whole other element of them that
14 that doesn't work on, especially when we are
15 protecting the population the way we are now, and
16 that's a big difference from when we got here.
17 Remember, it was all about transition when we got
18 here, and now it's all about protecting the
19 population.

20 So there's a whole lot of Sunnis that used
21 to be anti-occupation, but they aren't anymore. They
22 want us here. There is no doubt about it, and they've

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1 changed their tune.

2 So, yes, you have those elements that are
3 going to always anti-occupation, but I would say the
4 vast majority of the Iraqi population is not. You
5 know, they are ambivalent in many ways. They are not
6 hard core anti-occupation. They will always join just
7 to get us out of here.

8 There are times when they will, but for
9 the most part, as long as we are protecting them and
10 they get some good out of it, they are not going to--

11 [REDACTED] Diminished over the course of
12 this past year?

13 [REDACTED] The last year. There is no
14 doubt in my mind. They usually -- Anbar, and that's
15 the easiest example. I mean, you remember what
16 happened. You know, you had [REDACTED]
17 out there saying that -- you know, it will never be
18 good; it will always be an al Qaeda stronghold. We
19 talked to him a couple of weeks ago, and he said I
20 would have bet Fort Knox that this never would have
21 happened, you know. That's kind of what he says.

22 So that is an example of that sentiment

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1 changing, because they were definitely -- I mean,
2 having been here for Fallujah 1 and Fallujah 2 and
3 everything else, that was all anti-occupation
4 throughout, and it's not anymore. They want us to
5 stay, for the most part. So that's one example.

6 (b)(3), (b)(6) I wanted to ask about
7 some of the interactions and interface with the
8 Information Operations piece. In general, I just
9 wanted to ask what sort of interaction is there
10 between C-2 and IO, and just looking for some sense as
11 an intelligence officer and the C-2 what your
12 perspective is on how the messaging piece has played
13 in, and do you get feedback through intelligence
14 channels as to how we are sort of doing on that front
15 of psychological ops and sort of getting people over
16 to our way of thinking.

17 (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes. That's something
18 that, speaking of getting back to Fort Hood, I want to
19 spend a little on, figuring out what we did right and
20 what we did wrong; because we did something right,
21 because the IO effort over the last year has been
22 great. General McDonald and his crew have done a

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1 great job.

2 The intel support to him -- Intel support
3 to IO was hard last time we were here, our last
4 rotation, because the whole IO program was kind of in
5 the beginning. Now they've got it to the point where
6 it's easy to support them, because what they need to
7 know is who to target and how to do it and get
8 feedback on it.

9 We've got the systems, whether it's [14c]
10 (Phonetic), [14c] (Phonetic) and everything else out
11 there -- and it's mostly [14c]

12 [14c]

13 [14c] But the systems are in place as long as
14 you've got the right tasking out there and you are
15 listening for the right thing, talking to the right
16 people.

17 You can get them what they need to get the
18 right message to the right people, see who is
19 susceptible to the message and all, and then you get
20 the feedback on how well it is working.

21 I'll give you an example of the feedback
22 mechanism. You know, they used to have the [4b, 1.4c, 1.4d]

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1 [1.4b, 1.4c, 1.4d] when we were here our last
2 rotation. In the intervening years it went away, and
3 that's one of the first things that General Odierno
4 himself and I noted when we got here.



18 That is helpful in a lot of other ways,
19 too. I mean, that's helpful in governance. It's
20 helpful in the economics, you know, the things that we
21 are targeting, surf for and all those types of
22 programs, but then again it helps with the IO program

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1 as well.

2 So as we are doing our regular intel work
3 for these other lines of operation, we are able to
4 support IO pretty well. So it will be interesting.

5 General McDonald, I think -- trust me, he
6 would tell me if we weren't giving him what he needs.
7 So I think he is happy with the support, but the
8 bottom line is, it's not like you have this intense IO
9 only focused effort for intelligence to support it.
10 It is kind of a natural component of the overall intel
11 effort when you are supporting more than just the
12 security line of operation, which I think we are doing
13 fairly well now.

14 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : It almost sounds like
15 you are saying it's almost just finding a new market
16 for existing products. Is that --

17 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, and taking your
18 existing collectors and making sure they are tasked to
19 do the right things. So they are not -- You know,
20 they are not just looking for HVIs and those guys,

21 [REDACTED] 1.4c

22 or you are having a [REDACTED] 1.4c go ask about it.

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1 They are out there asking the other questions as they
2 do their collection. So you got them tuned into the
3 right --

4 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) Is the mechanics of
5 the interface that you have with IO this time
6 something that should be noted? In other words, is
7 there an ongoing meeting? How is that fusion achieved
8 when you talk about it this time? Is someone embedded
9 in your team? Do you have some body embedded in
10 theirs?

11 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) We do not. In fact --
12 Well, [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) (Phonetic) is the
13 reconciliation guy and, as you know, IO and
14 reconciliation are all located together. They are not
15 all the same. He is up there with [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)
16 (Phonetic) who is the IO guy.

17 So if they need some adjustment, they just
18 tell us, and we do it. So there is not a -- It's not
19 like there is a IO targeting type board system where
20 we are going through a process.

21 Fortunately, the other processes seem to
22 support getting them what they need. So I'm not going

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1 to say it's informal, because it's not. It's embedded
2 in every other process we do.

3 IO -- I don't think it can be standalone.
4 I think it's part of everything that you do. So
5 because it is, you know, whether it's those intel
6 products that the CG gets in the morning are inclusive
7 and kind of the same thing the IO guys need to know as
8 well. So that's a consideration in what we do, both
9 in terms of the question I talked about before and in
10 terms of the analysis and products that we give folks.

11 That's why I said I want to do an article
12 or something on it when I get back, because when you
13 prepare -- When we prepared for the exercise, when you
14 go through all the MRX process and all, it's very
15 structured.

16 Whether it is targeting or whether it is
17 IO, and they are very similar, there's this process
18 that is there. It's a debilitating process that sucks
19 away all your time, and we've gotten away from that.
20 We've been able to get away from it and still achieve
21 greater effects than some have, I think, without
22 having this -- It's not all about process. It's all

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1 about product. It's all about output right now, and
2 we achieved that in IO, I think, as well as targeting.

3 [REDACTED] Great.

4 [REDACTED] [REDACTED], in one of my
5 first -- and actually, I think it was my first
6 interview with you, you talked about the importance of
7 the relationships -- of relationships in general, and
8 the CT team that you brought over here, the experience
9 of working together with G-2s in past rotations. You
10 mentioned a couple of names.

11 Before I get to the actual question, I
12 wondered if you know -- you probably do -- [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED] (Phonetic), 4th ID [REDACTED]

14 [REDACTED] Right now? [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED] You know him. That's an
17 example. But over the course of this deployment, can
18 you talk a little bit about how the C-2 has evolved
19 and if you think you kept that tight team that you
20 brought here and trained with?

21 I know that the case has turned over, for
22 example, and we discussed that, actually, I think, in

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1 the last interview. But I know you had placed back in
2 March a lot of emphasis on the teamwork.

3 I wonder if you would reflect on that over
4 the past 15 months now at the end of this tour?

5 (b)(3), (b)(6) Well, that's certainly the
6 key to my success, has been the people that we
7 assembled before we came, trained with, and then
8 brought over. So that has continued to pay off.
9 There is no doubt about it.

10 Without going into the exact people, but
11 essentially I've got the same team that was hand-
12 picked before I came here in C-2 proper as the core,
13 and I say c-o-r-e, of that team. So that's what has
14 been helpful. But the people who joined us all along
15 have become just as valuable. But I attribute that to
16 the fact they joined a team that was pretty high
17 performing and pretty tight, but very willing to be
18 inclusive of new folks that came along.

19 So I think the legacy of that is that
20 those people who joined us as individual augmentees
21 have gotten up to a level where there will be good
22 continuity with (b)(3), (b)(6) (Phonetic) team when

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1 he gets here with 18th Airborne Corps.

2 Now one thing I have noticed is that after
3 he did his PSS, saw what we did, he has worked very
4 hard to assemble a team himself that, I think, will be
5 real strong. He lost his deputy. She had medical
6 issues, and he had to replace her, but with people
7 that General Austin knew, a Lieutenant Colonel that he
8 knew and, I think, that (b)(3), (b)(6) knew, too.

9 So I think they sort of followed the same
10 model. So I'm not unique in this, I don't think, now
11 any longer. I think he has been successful in forming
12 a team as well. But the answer to your question is,
13 yes, it has continued to pay dividends. It has
14 continued to get better as we have gone along.

15 (b)(3), (b)(6) I want to ask about a
16 specific challenge, which is actually something that
17 General Odierno pointed out that was picked up on in
18 the open medial. It has to do with dissatisfaction in
19 the grassroots of all the Shia population and the idea
20 that, at least in the open source, that none of the
21 Shia groups were really providing the sort of services
22 and satisfaction that the Shia citizenry wanted.

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1 Does our intelligence gathering -- have we
2 focused any efforts on that, and have you seen any
3 opportunities that we have exploited or just become
4 more aware of?

5 (b)(3), (b)(6) Well, we've definitely
6 focused the intelligence collection on that, because
7 clearly, if the groups that are not helpful are
8 providing those services as opposed to the government,
9 then we got a problem.

10 So the answer is, yes, we have -- both
11 1.4c have been focused. One of the things
12 they focus on is exactly that. So the opportunities
13 would be where to provide -- you know, urge the GOI,
14 and back to what we talked about, governance,
15 economics and all that -- We got to urge the
16 government of Iraq to focus some of its efforts so
17 that they are the provider of services, just like
18 there should be security, rather than some of these
19 other groups; because -- I mean, that is one of Jaish
20 al Mahdi's strengths, is that in some areas,
21 historically Sadr City, but there are others, they
22 could become a grassroots movement, because they were

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1 able to provide services that the government wasn't.

2 Now I think that is much less so now,
3 which is, I think, one of the reasons that, although
4 Moqtada al Sadr is not going to ever openly talk to us
5 probably -- at best, that we use interlocutors -- he
6 is willing to talk to the government of Iraq and
7 become more part of the mainstream, because their
8 capacity is improving, and it is no longer just him
9 and his movement that can offer those in certain
10 places, those services in certain places.

11 Yes, and that is back to -- I mean, that
12 is part of Intel operations in this environment, is
13 making sure you focus on collecting that and give the
14 decision makers that kind of information, which is far
15 different than the traditional security line of
16 operation support that we provide.

17 (b)(3), (b)(6) Just one more related
18 question that has actually has to do with a specific
19 situation. I'm just wondering how Intelligence has
20 played into the Commander's process for one of the
21 issues with the Concerned Local Citizens groups that
22 we have had a lot of success with.

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1 By the same token, it seems at this moment
2 we face two challenges. One is increasing tax on the
3 leaders of those CLCs. The flip side of that is the
4 risk of infiltration into those CLC groups.

5 How has intelligence coming into play to
6 help the Commander sort of sort that out and figure
7 out how to best deal with it?

8 (b)(3), (b)(6) We have a good window into
9 most of the CLCs, because we infiltrate them, too, and
10 that helps us know who the players are, who at least
11 the leaders are. So if you get infiltrated by the
12 individuals at the higher level, I think you know.

13 If you get groups that are purely -- and
14 there have been a couple of suspected -- groups that
15 were suspected of all. You know, being insurgents,
16 they just tried to pick up the mantle and be a CLC and
17 get in that way. Luckily, that wasn't the case, but
18 we needed to do the intelligence collection on them.

19 So infiltration is a risk. They will be
20 successful in some ways in some numbers, probably low
21 numbers, but we have a pretty good window on them.
22 But they are self-policing, too. I mean, they know

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1 their friends and neighbors pretty well, and they have
2 definitely policed themselves.

3 The other side of that is anybody
4 effective in this country is at risk, as long as
5 violence is going on, of being targeted. It happened
6 today in Mosul with the Provincial Director of Police
7 killed as he was inspecting the big glass site. You
8 probably heard about this today, killed by a suicide
9 vest bomber.

10 The same is going to be true -- We've got
11 some operations now that are being led -- initially
12 led by CLCs before the Iraqi Army goes into them.
13 There's a couple this upcoming week or so where that
14 is the case.

15 Well, you know, when you get CLCs that are
16 that effective, it's just like the P-Op in Mosul. I
17 mean, they are at risk of getting targeted by the
18 enemy in that area. So that is going to happen.

19 To me -- You know, we did a study, briefed
20 General Odierno about a week and a half ago, that said
21 when you look at the increase in number of people in
22 CLCs and the increase in number of attacks -- good

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1 proportion.

2 So in other words, it's not like suddenly
3 you have a whole bunch more attacks on a set or finite
4 number of people. It's the number of people has gone
5 up and, therefore, the number of those type of people
6 that have been attacked has gone up. So it's kind of
7 proportional.

8 So, therefore -- But the issue is their
9 leaders are getting targeted more, too, and I think
10 that is back to the fact that they are effective. So
11 it's a risk.

12 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Great.

13 [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6), I would like to
14 show you a slide from General Odierno's 17 January
15 briefing, Pentagon press briefing in which he showed
16 this map here, and he said that that had been captured
17 in Baghdad in December of '06 during the press
18 conference.

19 Are you familiar with this map?

20 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes.

21 [REDACTED] (b)(6) And can you tell me how much
22 or if it did play a part in your development of the

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1 Baghdad Belt analysis? Where I put it is February-
2 March. That's when I see the Baghdad Belt analysis
3 slides, but maybe you can be more specific.

4 (b)(3), (b)(6) Well, even before we
5 deployed, we looked at Saddam's Baghdad Belt strategy,
6 and he put divisions around Baghdad, because he
7 believed Baghdad was the center of gravity.

8 That helped us figure out, frankly, where
9 the vestiges of the enemy probably were, because of
10 where Saddam Fedahine (Phonetic) or Republican Guards
11 units had been and all of that. But it also told us
12 where al Qaeda in Iraq probably wanted to be in terms
13 of Baghdad itself, because that's just the mindset
14 they had.

15 So what -- This map was discovered in the
16 documents after that incident in December. It sort of
17 solidified what we thought, which is that they thought
18 the Baghdad Belts were important, and they intended to
19 use them to their advantage as well.

20 That all drove the decision making. That
21 component of the enemy analysis is what helped drive
22 the decision making on where units were.

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1 [b 6] Right. The surge units.

2 [b(3), b(6)] Absolutely. So instead of
3 putting them all in Baghdad proper, which I think was
4 the thought in Washington when the surge came, you
5 know, the decision was to -- We created Multinational
6 Division-Center as a result to deal with the southern
7 Belts, essentially, of Baghdad, and then, you know, we
8 put one brigade in Diyala, and then we put the rest
9 either in Baghdad or in the Belts.

10 So all of that analysis that you are
11 talking about that occurred drove where the surge
12 units went and how we employed those units, how we
13 fought the Battle of Baghdad, basically, is what it
14 is, which became, obviously, [b(6)] (Phonetic)
15 and into the further operations.

16 So it just brought home the fact that not
17 only is Baghdad the center of gravity, but the Belts
18 around Baghdad are very important.

19 [b(6)] Can you -- I'm a little bit --
20 The documents are a little bit non-specific or
21 unspecific in the dates when you did the Baghdad Belt
22 analysis or at least when I see the slides of the

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1 Baghdad Belts. It seems to be February-March, but is
2 that correct?

3 (b)(3), (b)(6) It is. I have to look at
4 the --

5 (b)(6) So it is correct? Okay.

6 (b)(3), (b)(6) It is, and I can go back in
7 there and look and tell you exactly. The day we
8 planned it, we took a picture.

9 (b)(3), (b)(6) I have that picture.

10 (b)(3), (b)(6) You have that picture. And
11 if I look in my e-mail, I can see what the date is on
12 it.

13 (b)(3), (b)(6) It was done by (b)(3), (b)(6) --
14 It was (b)(3), (b)(6) (Phonetic).

15 (b)(3), (b)(6) Did (b)(3), (b)(6) take it?

16 (b)(3), (b)(6) He's the one who gave
17 me the picture.

18 (b)(3), (b)(6) Actually, I think -- I'm
19 almost positive that General Devlin took the picture
20 himself.

21 (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, he mentioned it
22 was General Devlin. It must be the same one I'm

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1 thinking of.

2 (b)(3), (b)(6) So whenever that picture
3 was taken, that's when we did it, and I can find out.

4 b 6 Okay, thank you. That helps.

5 (b)(3), (b)(6) I wanted to ask
6 another interface question with another incident and
7 see how that's evolved over time. I wanted to ask
8 about combined Joint Special Operations Task Force
9 with Multinational Corps-Iraq, and if you can speak to
10 me about what that relationship has been along with C-
11 2 lines with them, and has the relationship changed
12 over the last 15 months as the battle has evolved and
13 as we have had things like reconciliation come into
14 play?

15 (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes. It started out real
16 strong, and it was far stronger when we got here this
17 time than the last rotation. It's back to
18 personalities as well as General McCrystal (Phonetic)
19 and General Odierno are great friends, classmates from
20 West Point, and Brigadier General Mike Flynn
21 (Phonetic) who was the J-2, Colonel Mike Flynn when we
22 got here was the J-2 of JSOC (Phonetic) and,

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1 therefore, the task force, were good friends, go way
2 back.

3 The mindset, though -- It was already in
4 place when we got here. That just made it all the
5 stronger, but the mindset had been one of cooperation.
6 No more, you know, black world group, you know,
7 typical of knowing what they are doing and a very
8 cooperative relationship, both in terms of operations
9 and in terms of intel.

10 So there wasn't anything to overcome when
11 we got here. It was just a matter of strengthening a
12 good relationship that already existed. They were
13 perfectly willing to share everything they got. We
14 are doing the same thing.

15 So you know, the mission is different,
16 though. I mean, their mission is very focused on high
17 value individual targeting, manhunting, and people
18 forget that sometimes. But we've got the whole broad
19 spectrum of every mission, and a subset of that now,
20 though, is exactly those operations.

21 So a brigade combat team commander has to
22 be able to do those kind of operations, manhunting,

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1 you know, persistent ISR on a target to do a capture
2 or kill operation, all the way out to, you know,
3 tracking the Prime Minister's convoy if he is going
4 through your battle space or, you know, chemical
5 munition coming from Tawatha (Phonetic) to BIOP
6 (Phonetic) to be thrown away -- actually, that was
7 radioactive material about a week and a half ago,
8 where you have -- I mean, the whole gamut of ISR.

9 The close relationship with JSOC allows to
10 share intel for similar targets or even shared
11 targets, but also get their -- We learned their
12 teaching, too. You know, we learned their procedures
13 by working so closely with them.

14 So that's why BCTs are able to do these
15 things just as well as they are, because they learned
16 from them, and they've got a good cooperative
17 relationship with them, and they operate in the same
18 battle space. They go around and, obviously, do their
19 high end operations within each of these brigades'
20 battle spaces. So they have a cooperative
21 relationship, too. But in terms of intel, very close.

22 (b)(3), (b)(6)

: Let me ask you this,

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1 if I could. Realizing this is a year that probably
2 people are going to pick apart in great detail as time
3 goes on, but one of the questions in general that will
4 probably be asked is: To what degree was that special
5 operations role key to the success?

6 From an intelligence officer's seat,
7 seeing what you see in terms of intelligence feedback,
8 how has that manhunting piece -- Any sense for how
9 much of a contribution that was or wasn't?

10 (b)(3), (b)(6) I think it's significant,
11 because it started out being al Qaeda only. So we'll
12 talk about that for a minute -- from al Qaeda in Iraq,
13 taking out key individuals, key leaders in the
14 networks, clearly always caused setbacks, and then it
15 always caused people who were considering joining that
16 effort to think twice and just waited some, because
17 they are so effective.

18 When they started getting the mission to
19 do extremist targets and set up Task Force 1.4a that
20 had the same effect. I mean, the most extremist
21 elements of Jaish al Mahdi who were attacking, for the
22 most part, Coalition forces were taken out, many of

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1 them, and then others were very much dissuaded from --
2 became very fearful.

3 Of course, what we were doing in Sadr City
4 -- that really had an effect. Much more reluctant to
5 do that now that there are cooperative elements of
6 JAM, but -- So I think what has been successful over
7 this past 15 months is the combination of all the
8 things that are going on.

9 That is back to what I said before. But
10 I do not specify their contribution, but yes, their
11 contribution at the high end, condition forces
12 operations across the battle space, the populace being
13 protected and turning against the extremist elements
14 on both sides, leaders on the JAM side or the Shia
15 side becoming compliant and cooperative with GOI and
16 the Awakening movements and Concerned Local Citizens
17 -- you put all that together, and a key component,
18 that high end targeting. But all these other things
19 with it become very effective.

20 (b)(3), (b)(6)

Thanks.

21 (b)(3), (b)(6)

22 That's a big answer to a
small question.

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1 [REDACTED] I have two real quick
2 questions. One is: Looking at Op Ord 08-0801, I read
3 your -- in the operations order, your Paragraph 1,
4 estimate of the enemy, and I compared it with 07-01,
5 and then I went to your intel estimate, and I couldn't
6 find your intel estimate.

7 When I clicked on the link, it linked me
8 to an '06 -- I think it was 06-03 intel estimate. Did
9 you --

10 [REDACTED] As far as I know, we had a
11 new one.

12 [REDACTED] You do have a new one?

13 [REDACTED] Right.

14 [REDACTED] Okay. It's the new computer.
15 Okay, that's solved.

16 Then I just had one final question. I'd
17 like you to, if you could, reflect on, probably in
18 your mind, the most important contribution the C-2
19 made over the last 14 months, 15 months. If you could
20 tie it to something very specific, that would be
21 helpful, but just a reflection on your part as the C-
22 2.

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1 (b)(3), (b)(6) I think I want to be a
2 maverick and tell you that I think the -- I'm going to
3 give you a general answer. Generally, I think we gave
4 the Commander good insight into what was going on in
5 terms of the very, very diverse threat, and the
6 populace, I guess I would say, the Iraqi people and
7 what they were thinking. So, yes, the threat. So we
8 got some insight into that.

9 The specific thing, I think -- and there's
10 been lots. So I'm on the spot. So I'm going to give
11 you what I can come up with now. But the thing that
12 comes to mind is that it was very obvious to us that
13 the Awakening movements were real and that the
14 Concerned Local Citizen program, if we stood it up,
15 would work.

16 I think that counsel to the Commander,
17 reinforcing what he thought, and this is all on
18 Odierno. The recognition of Awakening Councils and
19 seizing on the opportunity to do Concerned Local
20 Citizens in response to that, that's all General
21 Odierno with our insights: The Awakening is real;
22 CLCs are working.

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1 So that would be the one specific thing
2 that came to mind. There is a very specific intel
3 system out there, 14c and everything else,
4 that gave us that, with some real good analysis, I
5 would tell you.

6 Secondarily, another example, maybe
7 equally important -- I don't now -- that contributed
8 to that is that the surge has worked. In other words,
9 that 30,000 troops would make a difference in terms of
10 two things, combat power to do the things we talked
11 about earlier, but the signal that it would send to
12 both the enemy in terms of our resolve and it will
13 have an effect on the enemy in terms of combat
14 operations, and the reassurance to the population they
15 would be protected, securing the population being the
16 theme instead of transition for a while.

17 So those are two examples. I think -- and
18 I don't want to speak for him, but I think General
19 Odierno has incredible intuition as a commander, and
20 one of the things that is helpful, I think, is to be
21 able to take that intuition, that informed intuition,
22 and confirm or deny it. Usually, it was confirming,

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1 because he is usually right, but you know,
2 occasionally it was denying.

3 Those are two examples when I think we
4 were able to feel good about his intuition, which he
5 went with. In one case, politically sensitive to do
6 it, in the case of the surge; and in another
7 operationally risky to go with Awakening movements,
8 trust them, and seize on them with CLCs.

9 [REDACTED] (b)(6) Sure. Thank you.

10 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) One recent thing was
11 an uptick in the infrastructure attacks, in particular
12 on some of the electricity sites. Any reason from
13 intelligence that that was organized --

14 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) I am not convinced there
15 was an uptick. If you go back and do the analysis,
16 I'm convinced that -- Well, let me back up and tell
17 you.

18 If you do the analysis, there are periods
19 when -- from 2003 all the way to now, where there are
20 spikes and, yes, there have been spikes. What
21 happened, though, was that General Petraeus -- He
22 resolved to do something about the infrastructure, you

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1 know, make things happen, made them even more
2 significant.

3 So in other words, used to be -- I don't
4 want to indict anybody, but we would just let the
5 process work as far as repair and those kinds of
6 things, but now we are making such progress in getting
7 this infrastructure up that what used to be viewed as
8 minor are now majors. You can't get the 46-inch
9 pipeline, you can't get the right power line up and
10 all -- it's a big deal to General Petraeus.

11 So I think that heightened the awareness
12 that these infrastructure attacks were happening.
13 They have always happened, and many times for locals.

14 Do I think there is a concerned effort?
15 No, I do not. If they really wanted to go do
16 something debilitating, they can do it, and they
17 really haven't. You know, it's potshots at the
18 infrastructure when you get right down to it.

19 So I don't think it's concerning, but I
20 think it has been -- It has hampered the progress they
21 have made, the other side of that being that General
22 Petraeus and General Odierno as the guy who's got to

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1 send forces out to help them and very proactive in
2 repairing them, securing them, repairing them, and
3 improving the infrastructure as well. So heightened
4 awareness as opposed to more attacks or any kind of
5 coordinated effort, in my opinion.

6 (b)(3), (b)(6) Can I get one more in
7 here before we break? Task Force 1.4a and detainee
8 releases: I'm just wondering about what your thoughts
9 are from an intelligence standpoint on the release of
10 these detainees and how that impacts the fight, and
11 are we actually seeing vigilante type action out there
12 when they are released in areas where there is a
13 strong CLC presence, for instance, or a strong
14 community presence that didn't want them released?

15 (b)(3), (b)(6) There has been some
16 recidivism, you know, but not as bad yet as some
17 people have feared. We'll see how these increased
18 releases go. However, the detainee release program
19 has been good in some aspects when targeted. In other
20 words, when we release detainees that will do good for
21 us, we have guarantors and their intent is to go back
22 and assist -- those very specific detainees have been

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1 helpful.

2 So you can make the detainee program work
3 for you. I'm not saying every one of those was a good
4 idea, but some were, and some are helpful. Some are
5 not. So that's been -- You know, it has assisted in
6 some ways with reconciliation. It has assisted in
7 garnering support from the local populace, if you do
8 certain detainees or sometimes certain numbers of
9 detainees and those kinds of things.

10 There has been recidivism where you've had
11 guys who have done significant attacks, who you go
12 back and find have been released previously. So
13 there's two sides to the coin.

14 (b)(3), (b)(6) Thanks very much.

15 That concludes this interview.

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